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I. Introductory Remarks
A central purpose of the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules)
becomes clear to anybody reading and analyzing the Rules. That purpose is to
protect clients by ensuring that they receive independent counsel.1 As a general
matter, and particularly when conflicts of interest are involved, the best way to
safeguard independent representation is to ensure that attorneys do not have a
conflict of interest, because such a conflict usually means that the attorney cannot
provide independent representation.
Attorney disqualification is one tool for remedying conflicts of interest that
undermine independent counsel in proceedings before a tribunal. Typically,
movants bring the issue of a conflict of interest to a tribunal’s attention through
a motion to disqualify.2 When considering these motions, tribunals must balance
two competing interests. First, a client’s right to choose counsel of their choice.
As one court noted, “[l]egal practitioners are not interchangeable commodities.”3
Because personal qualities and professional abilities differ among attorneys, a
client’s choice in representation is critical in both the quality of the attorneyclient relationship and the skills and professional services rendered to the client.4
Second, a client’s choice of counsel can conflict with the legal profession’s
interest in maintaining its ethical standards. These standards, which include the
prohibition against conflicts of interest that undermine an attorney’s independent
judgment, are paramount in protecting clients and preserving trust in the
bar.5 When appropriate, a client’s right to choose representation must yield to
ethical principles.6
Tribunals use motions to disqualify to resolve these competing interests.
Ideally, a tribunal ruling on such a motion will consider the competing interests

E.g., Wyo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.7 cmt. [1] (2018) (“Loyalty and independent
judgment are essential elements in the lawyer’s relationship to a client.”).
1

2
Though courts may also raise the issue of a conflict of interest sua sponte, absent any party’s
motion. See infra notes 47–52 and accompanying text.
3

Towne v. Hubbard, 3 P.3d 154, 160 (Okla. 2000).

4

Id.

E.g., People ex rel. Dep’t of Corps. v. Speedee Oil Change Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 371, 378
(Cal. 1999).
5

6

Id.
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outlined above. But in Wyoming, tribunals often do not give due regard to
the ethical implications of a client’s choice in counsel because they apply the
client-only standing rule.7 This principle requires movants to first establish
standing before the tribunal will consider whether disqualification under the
Rules is appropriate.8 As its name suggests, only current or former clients of
the attorney in question can establish standing.9 Consequently, tribunals only
consider the substance of a motion to disqualify that current or former clients
submit. Because tribunals will not address conflicts of interest that non-clients
raise in a motion to disqualify, diminished representation may persist throughout
litigation, despite the presence of an impermissible conflict. Ultimately, a clientonly standing favors a client’s choice in representation over ensuring legal or
judicial ethics, or both.
As a remedy, this Article proposes that Wyoming tribunals extend standing
to non-clients moving to disqualify opposing counsel for a conflict of interest.
This proposal is consistent with Wyoming jurisprudence.10 Further, it will allow
tribunals to consider the substance of any party’s motion, filling the gap that
client-only standing currently creates. If followed, this proposal will ensure that
tribunals adequately examine the tensions that a motion to disqualify reveals, and
will ultimately protect the competing interests of clients, the bar, and tribunals.
Part II of this Article offers an overview of Wyoming’s current conflict of
interest framework, placing the issue in context.11 Next, Part III examines clientonly standing and its pernicious effects.12 It then provides three rationales, each
consistent with Wyoming law, for extending standing to non-client movants
seeking disqualification for a conflict of interest.13 Last, Part IV considers two
possible objections to the proposed remedy.14

See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 6 cmt. i (Am. Law Inst.
2000) (“The costs associated with disqualification require that standing to seek disqualification
ordinarily be limited to present or former clients who would be adversely affected by the continuing
representation, whether or not they are parties to the present litigation. Tribunals should not
ordinarily permit parties who are not directly affected to invoke the putative interests of an absent
client with whom they are not in privity.”).
7

8

See id.

9

See id.

10

See infra notes 42–56 and accompanying text.

11

See infra notes 15–32 and accompanying text.

12

See infra notes 33– 41 and accompanying text.

13

See infra notes 42–56 and accompanying text.

14

See infra notes 57–73 and accompanying text.
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II. Wyoming’s Current Conflict of Interest Framework
A. Ethical and Legal Issues Stemming from a Conflict of Interest
Conflicts of interest present both ethical and legal issues. All attorneys must
appropriately identify and respond to conflicts.15 Failure to do so is unethical
and grounds for professional discipline.16 That failure may also have legal
consequences, resulting in a motion to disqualify the attorney from representing
a client,17 a legal malpractice claim,18 or both. Because a conflict of interest may
result in disqualification, it is important to examine the rules governing conflicts
of interest.19

B. Conflict of Interest Rules
The Rules articulate at least four kinds of conflicts and provide the substantive
basis for disqualifying counsel for a conflict of interest. First, a conflict may
result from diverging interests between clients, whether current,20 former,21 or
prospective.22 Second, the interests of a non-client, such as a third-party payer,
may also conflict with those of a client.23 Third, the attorney’s own interests
may be inconsistent with a client’s, resulting in a conflict.24 Last, a conflict may

15

Wyo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.7 cmt. [2] (2018).

Wyo. Rules of Disciplinary Proc. r. 8(a)(1) (2018) (“Any act or omission which
violates the provisions of the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct [shall constitute grounds
for discipline].”).
16

17
E.g., Rose v. Rose, 849 P.2d 1321, 1325 (Wyo. 1993) (stating that trial courts have
discretion in granting a motion to disqualify for a conflict of interest).
18
Bevan v. Fix, 42 P.3d 1013, 1029–30 (Wyo. 2002) (explaining that a breach of the
confidentiality and conflicts of interest rules gives rise to potential civil liability and a breach of
confidentiality or loyalty will be analyzed within the framework of a legal malpractice action).
19

See infra notes 20–25 and accompanying text.

Wyo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.7(a)(1) (“A concurrent conflict of interest exists if . . .
the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client . . . .”).
20

Id. r. 1.9(a) (“A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter
represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests
are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed
consent, confirmed in writing.”).
21

22
Id. r. 1.18(c) (“A lawyer . . . shall not represent a client with interests materially adverse
to those of a prospective client in the same or a substantially related matter if the lawyer received
information from the prospective client that could be significantly harmful to that person in
the matter . . . .”).

Id. r. 1.7(a)(2) (“A concurrent conflict of interest exists if there is a significant risk that the
representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities . . . to
a third person . . . .”).
23

Id. (“A concurrent conflict of interest exists if there is a significant risk that the representation
of one or more clients will be materially limited . . . by a personal interest of the lawyer.”).
24
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arise by virtue of the attorney-client relationship, a matter which is subject to
the substantive law of the jurisdiction.25 While different rules apply depending
on the type of conflict involved, all conflicts of interest threaten an attorney’s
independent judgment.

C. Standing to Move for Disqualification
An opposing party may move to disqualify an attorney for failing to
remedy a conflict of interest. Before considering the substantive basis of these
motions, Wyoming tribunals first address whether the movant has standing
to seek disqualification.26 Absent standing, tribunals deny the motion without
considering the issue raised. In Wyoming, the moving party has standing if that
party has a tangible interest in the opposing party’s choice of counsel.27 This means
that the movant must demonstrate that continued representation of the opposing
party by their present attorney will “materially harm a cognizable interest of the
objecting party.”28
Generally, the tangible interest requirement restricts standing to movants
having an attorney-client relationship with the attorney in question, an approach
named client-only standing. Consider Wyoming’s leading case on the issue:
Ahearn v. Ahearn. In Ahearn v. Ahearn, the answering party challenged a motion
to disqualify that alleged an impermissible conflict of interest, arguing that the
movant lacked standing to raise the issue because the movant lacked an attorneyclient relationship with the attorney in question.29 The Wyoming Supreme Court
agreed.30 Because the movant had no relationship with the attorney, the movant
had no tangible interest in the opposing party’s representation, and the court
denied the motion.31 The court was clear that, even on the assumption that a
conflict exists, disqualification is unwarranted where the movant fails to show
that the opposing party’s representation harms the movant’s tangible interests.32 In
short, absent an attorney-client relationship between the movant and attorney in
question, Wyoming tribunals are unlikely to consider the substance of a motion
to disqualify alleging an impermissible conflict of interest.

25

Id. scope note, ¶ [17].

26

E.g., Robinson v. Hamblin, 914 P.2d 152, 154 (Wyo. 1996).

27

Id.

28

Charles M. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 7.1.7 (1986).

29

Ahearn v. Ahearn, 993 P.2d 942, 950 (Wyo. 1999).

30

Id.

31

Id.

32

Id.
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III. Extending Standing to Non-client Movants in Wyoming
While most jurisdictions apply the client-only standing rule to disqualifi
cation motions, some have broadened standing to include non-clients.33 A good
reason for doing so is that some conflicts only affect the tangible interests of
the aggrieved party. Examples may include conflicts that materially limit the
scope of an attorney’s representation because of third-party payers,34 fiduciary
obligations,35 the duty of confidentiality,36 or personal interests of the attorney.37
If a non-aggrieved party brings a motion to disqualify in these cases, the conflicted
representation eludes disqualification because the movant cannot establish that
the conflicted representation harms their tangible interests. In these and other
cases, the client-only standing rule precludes tribunals from considering the
substantive claim that a party’s representation presents ethical or legal problems
the tribunal should address.
Historically, the decisions granting non-clients standing generally relied upon
a rule contained in the antiquated Model Code of Professional Responsibility.38
That rule prescribed a broad duty on the part of advocates to alert the tribunal
to any possible violation of the professional rules on conflicts of interest.39 The
Rules, which displaced the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, omit this
See, e.g., In re Appeal of Infotechnology, Inc., 582 A.2d 215, 221 (Del. 1990)
(“[W]e do not adopt a ‘bright-line’ test denying standing to all non-client litigants to challenge
misconduct that taints the fairness of judicial proceedings.”); Tizes v. Curico, No. 94 C 7657,
1997 WL 116797 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 1997) (stating that a non-client may have standing to seek
disqualification if evidence clearly calls into question the fair or efficient administration of justice);
Black v. Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (explaining that, where the interests of the
public are greatly implicated, “third parties” should be entitled to raise any apparent conflict of
interest that might undermine the validity of proceedings in the case); Sentry Select Ins. Co. v.
Meyer, No. 2:07-cv-01049-RLH-LRL, 2011 WL 1103333 (D. Nev. Mar. 23, 2011) (stating that
opposing counsel has an independent obligation to bring to the court’s attention “facts justifying a
disqualification of counsel” even if opposing counsel does not represent the aggrieved client).
33

34
See Wyo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.8 cmt. [11] (2018) (“Because third-party payers
frequently have interests that differ from those of the client . . . lawyers are prohibited from accepting
or continuing such representation unless the lawyer determines that there will be no interference
with the lawyer’s independent professional judgment . . . .”).

See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof ’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-395 (1995) (describing
a situation where any attorney’s fiduciary obligations to a non-client as part of a previous jointdefense consortium may materially limit the attorney’s representation).
35

36
See Wyo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.9(c)(2) (“A lawyer who has formerly represented
a client in a matter . . . shall not thereafter . . . reveal confidential information relating to the
representation except as the Rules would permit or require with respect to the client.”).
37
See id. r. 1.7 cmt. [10] (“The lawyer’s own interests should not be permitted to have an
adverse effect on representation of a client.”).
38

The Model Code of Professional Responsibility was the predecessor to the Rules.

Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility, DR 1-103(A) (Am. Bar Ass’n 1980) (“A
lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of [misconduct] shall report such knowledge to a
tribunal . . . .”).
39
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provision,40 removing that basis for extending standing to non-clients in any
jurisdiction adopting them, such as Wyoming. Though that provision may no
longer provide a basis for extending standing in Wyoming, this Part considers
other well-established legal principles supporting this result.41

A. Parties in Pending Litigation have Standing to Seek Available Relief
It is well recognized that parties in pending litigation may move for available
relief without first establishing standing.42 This is because, as one court noted, a
party with standing to bring an action has standing to seek available relief during
that action.43 It is unnecessary, for example, that a movant demonstrate standing
when requesting a preliminary injunction.44 The question there is not whether the
movant is entitled to seek a preliminary injunction. Rather, the proper question is
whether the movant has established adequate grounds to obtain the injunction.45
By analogy, Wyoming tribunals should not consider whether a movant has
standing before addressing the issue of a conflict of interest. Because a motion
to disqualify is, according to Wyoming’s Supreme Court, “simply an injunctive
order issued in a case already pending,”46 Wyoming tribunals should direct their
attention instead to the motion’s substance, asking whether adequate grounds for
disqualification exist.

B. Wyoming Tribunals have the Inherent Authority and Obligation to
Disqualify Attorneys when Appropriate
Tribunals may raise the issue of attorney disqualification sua sponte, absent
any party’s request. This power is “incidental to all courts.”47 It draws on the
inherent power of tribunals to regulate attorneys’ conduct and the presiding
official’s inherent power to regulate the course of proceedings.48 It also furthers
40
While the commentary to Rule 1.7 formerly said that “opposing counsel may properly
raise the question [of an impermissible conflict],” that language was omitted when the Rules were
revised. Compare Wyo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.7 cmt. [14] (2005), with Wyo. Rules of
Prof’l Conduct r. 1.7 cmt. [1]–[35] (2018).
41

See infra notes 42–56 and accompanying text.

42

See, e.g., Bevan v. Fix, 42 P.3d 1013, 1028 (Wyo. 2002).

Common Cause v. Bd. of Supervisors, 777 P.2d 610, 613 (Cal. 1989) (stating that a party
who has standing to bring an action has standing to seek available provisional relief in that action).
43

This is evidenced by the absence of a standing requirement for Wyoming motion practice.
See Wyo. R. Civ. P. 7(b).
44

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-28-102 (2018) (“When it appears by the petition that the plaintiff
is entitled to relief consisting of restraining the commission or continuance of some act . . . a
temporary order may be granted restraining that act.”).
45

46

Bevan, 42 P.3d at 1028.

47

E.g., Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. 529, 531 (1824).

Wyo. Unif. R. Dist. Ct. 801; see also Restatement (Third)
Lawyers § 6 cmt. i (Am. Law Inst. 2000).
48

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2019

of the

Law Governing

7

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 19 [2019], No. 2, Art. 4

266

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 19

the Rules’ objectives by ensuring that a case is well-presented, that confidential
information is not misused, and that a client’s interest in their attorney’s loyalty
is protected.49
In Carlson v. Langdon, the Wyoming Supreme Court commented on a court’s
inherent authority to disqualify.50 Wyoming trial courts, it declared, are “charged
with the responsibility of supervising the conduct of attorneys practicing before
[them].”51 This supervisory responsibility includes, the court continued, “a duty
to disqualify an attorney when appropriate.”52
Non-client standing is consistent with Wyoming tribunals’ inherent power
to disqualify. A motion raising a conflict of interest is a tool for bringing the issue
to the tribunal’s attention. In that instance, the moving party is requesting that
the tribunal act on both its inherent power and affirmative duty to disqualify.
Client-only standing is inconsistent with this idea. It makes little sense to require
a moving party to establish that the opposing party’s choice of counsel harms
their own tangible interests. As outlined above, the tribunal is already obligated
to provide that same relief, when appropriate, on its own accord, regardless of any
party’s request.
Too often, client-only standing obscures the inherent authority of tribunals
to disqualify. It directs the tribunal’s attention to questions of standing instead
of the substantive issue. By redirecting the tribunal’s focus, non-client standing
ensures that tribunals consider all relevant interests.

C. Attorneys are Obligated to Protect Against a Tribunal’s Appearance
of Impropriety
Wyoming attorneys owe various duties to tribunals.53 Rule 3.4 imposes one
such duty. It states that an attorney shall not “knowingly disobey an obligation
under the rules of a tribunal.”54 In Wyoming, the Wyoming Code of Judicial
Conduct governs tribunals.55 It requires judges to avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety.56 One way to create an appearance of impropriety
is to present a tribunal with an impermissible conflict of interest. Attorneys
are therefore obligated to protect tribunals from representations afflicted with
impermissible conflicts.
49

Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 6 cmt. i.

50

See Carlson v. Langdon, 751 P.2d 344 (Wyo. 1988).

51

Id. at 350.

52

Id.

53

E.g., Wyo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 3.3 (2018).

54

Id. r. 3.4(c).

55

See Wyo. Code of Judicial Conduct § I application note (2018).

56

E.g., id. r. 1.2.
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Attorneys can invoke a motion to disqualify to further that end. But when
non-clients are denied standing, conflicts may threaten a tribunal’s appearance of
impropriety. Client-only standing, therefore, undermines attorneys’ duties toward
tribunals. By ensuring that tribunals address the issue, extending standing to nonclients assists attorneys in realizing their ethical duties.

IV. Possible Objections
While it is difficult to anticipate every objection to extending standing to
non-client movants, this Part counters two predominant and related objections.57
First, non-client standing will defeat the purpose of the conflicts rules. And second,
non-client standing opens the door to abusive motions. Client-only standing, in
short, furthers the ends of the conflicts rules and is necessary to prevent abuse.

A. “Client-only Standing Furthers the Rules’ Purposes”
One reason tribunals hesitate in granting non-clients standing is fear that
movants will subvert the conflicts rules’ legitimate purposes, using them instead
as procedural weapons against opponents.58 One commentator has noted, for
example, that “disqualification motions have become common tools of the
litigation process, being used . . . for purely strategic purposes.”59 In Woods v. Wells
Fargo Bank of Wyoming, Wyoming’s Supreme Court made it clear that it will not
look favorably on motions to disqualify that are not based on the purposes for the
conflict of interest rules. It stated:
The purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are
invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact
that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer’s self-assessment, or for
sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary
authority, does not imply that an antagonist . . . has standing to
seek enforcement of the Rule.60
This policy purportedly draws its strength from the conflict rules themselves.61
Because the rules prohibiting conflicts are intended to protect current and former
clients, some argue, only they are the proper parties to raise the issue.62

57

See infra notes 58 –73 and accompanying text.

58

E.g., In re Appeal of Infotechnology, Inc. 582 A.2d 215, 220 (Del. 1990).

Ellsworth Van Graefeiland, Lawyer’s Conflict of Interest—A Judge’s View (Part II), N.Y.L.J.,
July 20, 1977, at 1.
59

60

Woods v. Wells Fargo Bank Wyo., 2004 WY 61, ¶ 24, 90 P.3d 724, 732 (Wyo. 2004).

61

Mills v. Hausmann-McNally, S.C., 992 F. Supp 2d 885, 891 (S.D. Ind. 2014).

62

Id.
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Unquestionably, one purpose of the conflicts rules is to preserve a client’s
expectations of confidentiality and undivided loyalty.63 At times, disqualification
serves to protect against breaches of these principles. But, as one court noted,
“conflicts of interest, including potential conflicts . . . are a threat not only to
the rights and interests of clients and attorneys, but also to the integrity of the
court.”64 Other courts have observed that the conflicts rules also serve to maintain
public confidences in the integrity of the bar 65 and the legal system,66 as well as
the fairness of the judicial process as a whole.67 In some instances, a non-client
movant is best situated to ensure that these purposes are achieved by bringing the
issue to a tribunal’s attention. Because client-only standing frustrates these ends, it
too can subvert the legitimate purposes of the conflicts rules. Far from a remedy,
client-only standing actually engenders the effect it is intended to prevent.

B. “Non-client Standing Opens the Door to Abuse”
All motions for interlocutory relief, including motions to disqualify, have
the potential for abuse. This may happen, for instance, when parties use motions
as mere procedural weapons in litigation. But several devices exist for deterring
such practices.
In civil cases, Rule 11 of Wyoming’s Rules of Civil Procedure requires movants
to certify that, to the best of their knowledge, their motion is not presented for any
improper purpose and that its contentions are warranted by law and either do or
likely have evidentiary support.68 Violation of this Rule may result in sanctions.69
Also, in both civil and criminal cases, Rule 801 of Wyoming’s Uniform Rules for
District Courts requires attorneys to demonstrate honesty, fairness, and integrity
in all of their dealings.70 Under this Rule, any attorney who uses their position to
harass others involved in the adjudicative process violates the professional standard
of conduct and may be subject to formal reprimand or other sanctions.71 Lastly,

63

See Wyo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct rr. 1.7 cmt. [1], 1.9(c) (2019).

Ragan Henry Broad. Grp., Inc. v. Hughes, Civ. A. No. 91-CV-6157, 1992 WL 151308 at
*5 (E.D. Pa. June 19, 1992).
64

65
See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 103 F.R.D. 22, 27 (D.D.C. 1984)
(“[C]onflicts . . . give rise to many substantive evils and they tend to diminish the Bar’s image in the
mind of the public.”).
66
See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Daniel Int’l Corp., 563 F.2d 671, 673 (5th
Cir. 1977).
67

See, e.g., Coleman v. Smith, 814 F.2d 1142, 1147 (7th Cir. 1987).

68

Wyo. R. Civ. P. 11.

69

Id.

70

Wyo. Unif. R. Dist. Cts. r. 801(a).

71

Id.
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an attorney may be disciplined for asserting a frivolous issue in a proceeding based
in neither law nor fact.72
While extending standing to non-clients may open the door to abuse, that
risk is no greater than the risk that other interlocutory requests present.73 If the
devices outlined above are sufficient in guarding against other abusive motions,
are they not sufficient for deterring abusive motions to disqualify?

V. Concluding Thoughts
Too often, tribunals fail to address the fundamental issue that motions
to disqualify raise.74 That issue is whether enhancing the tribunal’s stature is
justified at the expense of a client’s choice in counsel. For example, many courts,
including the Wyoming Supreme Court, have held that tribunals should first
ask about a movant’s standing to disqualify before addressing whether the Rules
provide adequate grounds for disqualification.75 This policy prevents tribunals
from examining motions worthy of their consideration. By extending standing to
non-client movants, tribunals will not be bothered with such questions. Instead,
they will address the heart of the issue. This Article has offered three reasons for
extending standing to non-clients moving to disqualify opposing counsel that
are consistent with Wyoming jurisprudence.76 If adopted, this policy will further
the interests of clients, tribunals, and the profession.

72

See Wyo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 3.1(a) (2018).

Not only does Rule 11 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure provide sanctions, but
Rule 3.1 of the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct contains a version of Rule 11, so every
lawyer is bound to the Rule 11 standard in every case. See id.
73

Because, for example, the movant does not have standing. See supra notes 26–32 and
accompanying text.
74

75

E.g., Ahearn v. Ahearn, 993 P.2d 942, 950 (Wyo. 1999).

76

See supra notes 42–56 and accompanying text.
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